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Wershow: Ad Valorem Assessments in Florida--Whither Now?

AD VALOREM ASSESSMENTS IN FLORIDA
WHITHER NOW?

-

JAMES S. WERSHOW*

Since the Florida "bust" of 1925 a profound change has taken
place in the role of ad valorem taxation in Florida. Traditionally
the ad valorem tax is associated with land and the right to possession
of land. It was early recognized that such possession carried with it
the inherent responsibility of making some payment in return for
public services necessary for the perpetuation of the right of exclusive ownership.
In a traditional agricultural economy in which individual land
ownership was the basis for economic well-being and the demand for
governmental services was small, the ad valorem tax problem was of
little consequence. The scarcity of population in given areas and the
close-knit society of the rural communities prevented the ad valorem
tax from becoming oppressive. The local county tax assessor, the
constitutional arbiter of assessment' in a given area, intimately knew
the status of the land in the vicinity and hearkened to the democratic
process that elected him to office. Although officially adhering to the
standards as set forth in the state and federal constitutions, he nevertheless made equitable adjustments upon a local basis. Moreover, an
elected board of county commissioners sitting as a board of equalization usually arbitrated any controversial assessment problems that
arose. In other words, matters concerning ad valorem taxation in
Florida were actually determined and handled on a county basis rather
than statewide although the general guidelines for action in the
field were laid down by the state constitution and the state legislature.
The tax assessor, jealous of his authority under the state constitution
and eager to continue his tenure of office, took account of local
situations and usually turned up an assessment roll that satisfied, if
not pleased, his constituents.
The situation concerning ad valorem taxation changed, however,
as Florida's population expanded in an uneven growth. Most important in the evolution that followed was a new examination of land
use. This examination was not pursued in a precise scientific manner.
Instead, it proceeded in a scattered fashion depending entirely upon
who conducted the examination. As a matter of fact, specific groups
began a tug of war for the control of land use in desirable areas. Land
no longer had a purely agrarian value. These new interest groups
*B.A. 1935, LL.B. 1936, LL.M. 1939, Yale University; Member of the Connecticut
Bar and the Gainesville, Florida, Bar.
1. FrL,. CONsr. art. VIII, §6; FIA. STAT. §193.11 (1963).
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began to compete with each other and with the farmer for the use
of the land. As the struggle continued the peculiar concepts of each
competing group regarding land valuation crystallized. These concepts
of valuation were based almost entirely upon economic considerations,
but none of them rejected the primary thesis of ad valorem taxation.
These competing groups always accommodated their thinking to include the time-honored notion that those who use and possess the
land should pay part of the burden for services and government where
the land is located. Having rendered homage to ad valorem taxation,
they parted company and developed their own rules of measurement
as to what the land was worth and how it should be valued and
assessed.
It is not the intention of the author to reiterate in detail what has
been published in this law review concerning the complexities of this
struggle. 2 Suffice it to say that each interest group reechoed those economic tenets that result in the ultimate advantage for that particular
group. Moreover, to support this ultimate self-seeking position each
group developed a philosophy of its own that gave justification for its
position and actions.
Soon, however, competition between these interest groups led to
action in the political arena. It is at this point that the law began to
bear importantly on the complexities of the situation.
THE ROLE OF THE LEGISLATURE

The cornerstone of the law in this struggle is the assessment provisions of the Florida Constitution. Article IX, section 1, of the
constitution provides:
UNIFORM AND

EQUAL RATE

OF TAXATION;

SPECIAL RATES. -

The Legislature shall provide for a uniform and equal rate of
taxation, except that it may provide for special rate or rates on
intangible property . . . and shall prescribe such regulations

as shall secure a just valuation of all property, both real and
personal, excepting such property as may be exempted by law
for municipal, education, literary, scientific, religious or charitable purposes. (Emphasis added.)
Since most constitutional enactments are skeletal in nature, this
section is in good character. The real flesh is placed upon the skeleton when the legislature elaborates on the constitutional provision
through the legislative enactments and when the courts play their
interpretive role.
2.

Wershow, Ad Valorem Taxation and Its Relationship to Agricultural Land

Tax Problems in Florida, 16 U. FLA. L. REv. 521 (1964); Wershow, Agricultural
Zoning in Florida-Its Implications and Problems, 13 U. FLA. L. REv. 479 (1960).
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The pertinent legislative enactments in this area resulted from the
concentrated effort of different interest groups that were dissatisfied
with the impact of ad valorem taxes as it affected their economic position.
The history of Florida Statutes, section 193.11 (3), illustrates this
trend. The statute, although originally intended to remedy a local
situation in Dade County where many old subdivision remnants still
remained within the boundaries of present operating farms, nevertheless became important in subsequent struggles over preferential
land assessment. Section 193.11 (3) as enacted in 1957 provided:
All lands being used for agricultural purposes shall be assessed as agricultural lands upon an acreage basis, regardless of
the fact that any or all of said lands are embraced in a plat
of a subdivision or other real estate development. Provided,
"agricultural purposes" shall include only lands being used in
a bona fide farming, pasture or grove operation by the lessee
or owner, or some person in their employ. Provided shed
nurseries, or nurseries under cover, shall not be termed agricultural and shall be excluded from this law. Lands which have
not been used for agricultural purposes prior to the effective
date of this law shall be prima facie subject to assessment on
the same basis as assessed for the previous year, and any demand
for a reassessment of such lands for agricultural purposes shall
be subject to the severest scrutiny of the county tax assessor
to the end that the lands shall be classified properly.
Although this statute was strictly an assessment procedure, nevertheless many mistakenly have labelled it a "green belt law" although
it implied no land classification as such. 3 A 1963 legislative addition
to this subsection reemphasized the assessment feature: "Provided this
subsection shall not be construed, interpreted, or applied so as to
permit lands being used for agricultural purposes to be assessed other
than as agricultural lands and upon an acreage basis." 4
In 1959 the Florida Legislature enacted section 193.201; this statute is set forth in Appendix II. This act was drawn up to safeguard
agricultural lands being engulfed by the so-called "urban sprawl" in
the more populous areas of the state. As finally adopted, the act was
discretionary in its application by the counties; it also stressed the
restrictive role of the tax assessor in assessing agricultural lands. This'
measure is truly a land classification procedure and hence the term
"green belt," but the classification of land is accompanied by a pref3. Wershow, Agricultural Zoning in Florida-Its Implications and Problems,
13 U. FLA. L. REv. 479, 489 (1960).
4. FLA. STAT. §193.11 (3) (1963).
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erential land assessment based solely on agricultural use.
To reiterate, "agricultural lands shall include horticulture, floriculture, vitaculture, forestry, dairy, livestock, poultry, bee and all
forms of farm products and farm production." 5 The county tax assessor in assessing lands that fall within the statutory classification
shall consider no factors other than those relative to such use. 6 The
tax assessor in assessing land within this class shall take into con7
sideration the following use factors only:
the cost of the property as agricultural land,
the present replacement value of improvements thereon,
quantity and size of the property,
the condition of said property,
the present cash value of said property as agricultural land,
the location of said property,
the character of the area, or place in which said property
is located and
such other agricultural factors as may from time to time
become applicable.
Thus another set of assessment factors entered the already complex picture. Moreover, the hue and cry for enforcement of "full
cash value" on all assessments became statewide. This was particularly dominant in the areas where the need for more public services
accompanied urban and suburban expansion.
The next legislative move was the passage of Florida Statutes,
section 193.021. This 1963 enactment stated the county tax assessor
shall assess all the real and personal property in such a manner as will
secure a just valuation. The "full cash value" standard was deleted
from sections 193.06 and 193.11 (1). Section 193.021 specifically enumerated the factors that the county tax assessor should consider to
determine just value. These are:
(1) the present cash value of the property;
(2) the highest and best use to which the property can be expected to be put in the immediate future; and the present use of
the property;
(3) the location of said property;
(4) the quantity or size of said property;
(5) the cost of said property and the present replacement value
of any improvements thereon;
(6) the condition of said property;
(7) the income from said property.
5.
6.
7.

STAT. §193.201 (4) (1963).
FLA. STAT. §193.201(5) (1963).
FLA. STAT. §193.201 (5) (1963). (Emphasis added.)
FLA.
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With this array of legislative pronouncements the battle arena shifted
to the Florida court scene.
THE ROLE OF THE

COURTS

Although the legislative activities in the assessment field were spasmodic, the legislation that resulted was conflicting in nature and subject to varied interpretations.
As we focus on the role of the Florida courts in this enigmatic
situation we come upon an interesting but peculiar history. The heart
of ad valorem taxation depends solely upon the two important factors
of valuation and rate. With respect to valuation, article IX, section
1, of the Florida Constitution contemplates just valuation. This section further provides that the legislature shall prescribe regulations
that will secure this just valuation. Until the so-called "just valuation"
standard was set up by the legislature in section 193.021, just value
by legislative fiat was assessment at full cash value.8 The courts early
recognized the hollowness of this assertion when they frankly stated
that land in Florida was not assessed at more than 50 per cent of its
full cash value. 9
The situation was fluid for a number of years as the courts, struggling to reconcile the constitutional mandate with legislative enactments, used semantical legerdemain to avoid coming to grips with
the basic issues involved. This process of judicial evasion to prevent
direct involvement with the issues was abruptly halted by the impact
of McNayr v. State ex rel. DuPont Plaza Center, Inc.o In DuPont
Plaza Center, the Florida Supreme Court was faced with tie question
whether the tax assessor of Dade County could constitutionally levy
the ad valorem tax on the basis of one-half of the "just value" of
property carried on the tax roll. The court granted a writ of mandamus ordering a revision of the 1964 tax roll so that it would reflect
100 per cent of just value as required by the constitution and section
193.021 of the Florida Statutes. Perhaps the most persuasive argument
against the tax assessor's valuation procedure arose from the fact that
by levying on 50 per cent of the just value, property subject to the
homestead tax exemption greatly benefited because the value of the
homestead exemption became inflated."
It is interesting to note that the assessor was not accused of valuing
properties incorrectly but, as the court said: "the Tax Assessor... has
ascertained and determined the just valuation of all property subject
8. Fr.LA.
STAT. §§193.06, .11 (1) (1961).
9. Henderson v. Leatherman, 120 Fla. 496, 507, 163 So. 310, 314 (1935).
10. 166 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1964).
11. Id. at 143.
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to ad valorem taxes in Dade County, Florida, pursuant to the duty
imposed upon him by the Constitution and law of the State of Florida."12 The court went on to find, however, that although the tax
assessor had valued all property in Dade County, subject to ad valorem
taxes, uniformly and equally he erred in carrying such property on
the tax roll at only one-half of its just value. "This method of fixing
the valuation of property in Dade County, Florida is contrary to law
and is discriminatory.

... 13

The court emphasized that once the tax

assessor had determined the just valuation for the property his discretion ceased. On the advice of the Dade County tax assessor the
court ordered the present values fixed on the tax roll to be doubled
immediately so that just valuation would be accomplished.
Justice Ervin concurred in granting the writ; however, he pointed
out that doubling of the assessment was not a sure cure-all to secure
just valuation. He advocated proceeding with due caution giving full
attention to equitable consideration to avoid harshness, disruption
and drastic application, and to allow former orderly administration of
14
the taxing process.
In Tyson v. Lanier, 15 a divided Florida Supreme Court found
itself up against a fundamental issue from which there was no drawing
back. This controversy centered around an attempt to enjoin the
Osceola County tax assessor from assessing the plaintiff's farm lands
contrary to the provisions of section 193.11 (3) of the Florida Statutes.
The course of this litigation has already been described by the author
in a preceeding article in this review. 16 Since the lines for the succeeding battles were firmly drawn, however, a brief recount seems
appropriate.
The chancellor in the first instance found for the plaintiff. He
held section 193.11 (3) laid down a standard for the assessor to follow
in assessing agricultural lands that secured just valuation. He also
held that the classification of agricultural land was reasonable since
the valuation standard to be applied did not mean only present agricultural use but could imply the highest and best agriculturaluse.
The Second District Court of Appeal reversed the chancellor by a
two-to-one decision; 17 however, the majority refused to consider the
constitutionality of the statute. In essence, the court held that enforcement of the statute would amount to "a partial tax exemption"

12. Id. at 143.
13. Id. at 143.
14. Id. at 146.
15. 156 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1963).
16.

Wershow, Ad Valorem Taxation and Its Relationship to Agricultural Land

Tax Problems in Florida, 16 U. FLA. L. REv. 521, 533 (1964).
17. Lanier v. Tyson, 147 So. 2d 365 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
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for agricultural lands valued pursuant to the statute. judge White
dissented in a vigorous opinion and argued:1s
[N]o unlawful preferential treatment is accorded the agriculturist in comparison with the realistic treatment universally
accorded other classes of property owners, even though the
legislature apparently deemed it unnecessary to particularize
other classes. The realistic approach in making ad valorem
assessments is, after all, the traditional and practical approach.
. . . An established factory is not assessed according to its
potential as a grove or stock farm, even though adjacent owners
of the latter may be ready and willing to take over at some
fancy price.
Furthermore, Judge White asserted: 19
The land, particularly in view of the statute, should remain
and be valued in its present use classification unless and until
it passes into another class, in which event it should be assessed
accordingly at its full cash value.
The logical implication of Judge White's analysis is that just valuation and full cash value are not synonymous. This implication can be
explained away, as was done by the Florida Supreme Court,20 on the
interpretation that land subject to section 198.11 (3) is valued at its
full cash value solely as agriculturalland.
In due course the controversy came before the Florida Supreme
Court. Here Justice Terrell, for the majority, noted that in view of
the conflicting decisions in the lower courts that left the tax assessors
unable to perform their duties "it does seem that if there ever were a
case which requires this court to assume jurisdiction and clarify the
law, this is it."21
The learned justices of the Florida Supreme Court were no more
united in their thinking than were their lower court counterparts.
The result was a four-to-three decision.
The dilemma facing the court was to reconcile the preferential
treatment afforded agricultural lands under section 193.11 and the
constitutional requirement of an equal and uniform rate of taxation
and a just valuation of property to be taxed. Justice Terrell's rationale was:

22

18. Id. at 380.

19. Id. at 380. (Emphasis added.)
20. Tyson v. Lanier, 156 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1964).
21.

Id. at 835.

22. Id. at 837. (Emphasis added.)
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Careful examination of this statute reveals nothing but an
effort on the part of the legislature to classify agricultural lands
for tax purposes; it defines what constitutes agricultural lands,
points out exceptions to them and gives taxing officers other
leads to a correct assessment. We find nothing in the act inconsistent with the requirement of §193.11, Florida Statutes,
F.S.A., that all property be assessed at full cash value. Neither
do we find anything in the act that runs counter to the requirement of Section 1, Article IX, Florida Constitution, which
requires the legislature to "provide for a uniform and equal
rate of taxation . . . and shall prescribe such regulations as

shall secure a just valuation of all property."
In other words, the majority opinion in Tyson stands for the proposition that "full cash value" or just value can be determined for
agricultural lands without considering the reasonable uses to which
the property could be put. The holding definitely eliminates potential use for agricultural valuation purposes and it sanctions a
preferential assessment status for agricultural lands.
Justice Drew in his dissenting opinion attacked the majority position by asserting that the classification of agricultural land was not
23
based on its inherent characteristics, but instead on a
"classification" of taxpayers or owners of taxable realty so as to
single out those who choose or are able to subject their land to
agricultural use and accord to that group alone the right to
have the "just value" of their property determined on the basis
of actual use rather than on the basis of the same criteria controlling the valuation of other property.
Justice Drew's opinion stressed that a basic inequality existed when
different assessment standards were set forth for realty having the
same sale or market value merely because some of the lands are used
for agricultural purposes.2 4
A strict application of the ancient concept of equality and
uniformity - buttressed by a myriad of court decisions and constitutional provisions - is the only way to prevent a complete
erosion of these basic concepts in an area that has plagued men
from time immemorial. We cannot - and must not - in my

humble judgment make fish of one and fowl of the other.
It would seem that Tyson has created a dual "full cash value"
standard. Different legislative classifications allowing different asses23.
24.

Id. at 839.
Id. at 841.
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sing procedures give rise to this interesting phenomenon. The pronouncements of the majority in this case bear this out.
Although the battle lines were delineated in Tyson, the struggle
was not resolved. Subsequent to the Tyson decision, the 1963 Florida
Legislature enacted Florida Statutes, section 193.021.25 This is the
so-called "just value" statute, which set forth the factors that the
county tax assessor should consider in arriving at a just valuation of
realty. Along with other pertinent criteria this statute specifically set
forth present cash value of the property and the highest and best use
to which the property can be expected to be put in the immediate
future and the present use of the property.
With McNayr v. State ex rel. DuPont Plaza Center, Inc. 26 as a
forerunner, the case of Walter v. Schuler27 arose in Duval County.
The deplorable state of the public school system in that county,
which was attributable in the most part to the tax structure, motivated various groups of citizens to attack the existing real property
valuation procedures and standards employed by the county tax assessor. Using the result of DuPont Plaza Center as the focal point of
their attack, these groups secured court action for a redetermination
of the status of the Duval County tax rolls. It is interesting to note
that the plaintiffs sought a decree that just value and fair market
value were synonymous so that any assessment at other than 100 per
cent of fair market value would be illegal. Unlike DuPont Plaza
Center, in which the assessor admitted that only 50 per cent of just
value was used as the basis for land assessment within Dade County,
the tax assessor of Duval County denied that he had intentionally
assessed property at a percentage of just value or fair market value.
Once again the usual battle standards such as just value, full cash
value, fair market value, true cash value, real value, cash value, true
value, and market value were unfurled. Justice Thomas set the tone
8
by stating:2
From all accounts the tax roll of Duval County for 1964 is
a mess.
It seems gradually to have become so since the one in 1941,
which formed the basis for the rolls of succeeding years, until
in 1964 it reflected valuations approximating 40 per cent of
taxable value, although the Constitution all the while had commanded a distribution of the tax burden on the basis of "just
valuation."

25.
26.
27.
28.

See text of FLA. STAT. §193.021 (1963) in Appendix I.
166 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1964).
176 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 1965).
Id. at 82.
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In an attempt to secure an anchor for the deceptive concept of
just valuation, which is the ultimate criterion, Justice Thomas began
his analysis by employing the algebraic symbol "X." Just valuation,
according to the formula, was synonymous with "X." The simple
matter of determining "X" remained.
At the outset Justice Thomas forecloses any attempt to differentiate among the assorted words of art that are designated by the constitution, statutes, and court decisions as the criteria for ad valorem
tax assessment. A comparison of Florida Statutes, chapter 193 as
originally enacted, with the recently amended chapter 193 showed
only that the former assessment terminology was purely of academic
interest since section 193.021 specifically fixed the criteria for determining just valuation.29 And so Justice Thomas wrote: 3"
As used in the Constitution and the implementing statutes
valuation is the act of arriving at the real worth, or so it
seems to us from a study of the Constitution, statutes and decisions. If this idea be sound, and we think it is, then the
seven factors prescribed by the legislature are more easily
understood for, in approaching the correct basis for determining the tax burden, that is, the amount of "X," the assessor
shall on his journey take each factor into consideration.
After noting that any attempt at just valuation required that 100
per cent of just value be considered, Justice Thomas proceeded to
define "X" in light of the legislative mandates set out in section
193.021. He found that "fair market value" and "just valuation"
should be declared legally synonymous. 31 Fair market value was established as the amount that a purchaser willing, but not obliged to
buy, would pay to one willing but not obliged to sell. And so Justice
Thomas concluded: "If assessors will apply that and in doing so
observe the seven guideposts in Sec. 193.021, justness should be secured to the taxpayer and the tangle that has developed should be
unraveled."32

A special concurring opinion was filed by Justice Roberts 33 in
which he went further than Justice Thomas in recognizing that the
legislature can reasonably classify property for tax purposes. Justice
Roberts was alluding to the classification of agricultural lands in
Florida Statutes, section 193.11 (3). It is interesting to note that
three judges agreed with the opinion of Justice Roberts, which would
29. FLA.
30.
31.
32.
33.

STAT. §193.021 (1963); see text of statute in Appendix I.
Walter v. Schuler, 176 So. 2d 81, 84 (Fla. 1965).
ld. at 85.
Id. at 86.
Id. at 86.
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appear to elevate it to a majority opinion. This fact does not, however, affect the holding by Justice Thomas with respect to the
standard for determining just valuation.
The point raised by the special concurring opinion in Walter
regarding the reasonable classification of property for tax purposes5
34
leads into the cases of Lanierv. Overstreet and Markham v. Blount,3
decided the same day as Walter. Overstreet dealt squarely with the
constitutionality of section 193.11 (3), which the court refused to decide in Tyson v. Lanier.36 The constitutional question was more
clearly delineated by virtue of the amendment to section 193.11 (3),
which was adopted after the decision in Tyson. This amendment
provided: "this subsection shall not be construed, interpreted, or applied so as to permit lands being used for agricultural purposes to be
3
assessed other than as agricultural lands and upon an acreage basis." 7
A plain reading of this amendment dearly demonstrates the intent
of the legislature to afford preferential treatment to agricultural lands
for ad valorem tax purposes.
After reviewing the cases holding that the uniformity requirement
is applicable to the rate of taxation only and accepting this interpretation38 the majority approached the problem of the legislature's
power to classify property to secure just valuation. After due deliberation, the court decided "if a legislative directive designed to
secure a just valuation of a particular class of taxable property is
reasonable, not arbitrary or unjustly discriminatory, and applicable
39
alike to all similarly situated, it should be upheld by the courts."
The focal point in the deliberation centered around the potential
value of lands presently used for agricultural purposes.
Turning again to Florida Statutes, section 193.021, and singling
out subsection 2: "The highest and best use to which the property can
be expected to be put in the immediate future; and the present use of
40
the property;" the court stated:
[T]here is nothing in the legislative regulations respecting the
"just valuation" of taxable property to authorize the assessment
of property in accordance with a potential use which might be
made of the property at some future time. In this state, the ad
valorem tax on real and personal property accrues as of Janu34. 175 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1965).
35. 175 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1965).
36. 156 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1963).
37. FLA. STAT. §193.11 (3)(1963).
38. Contra, Note, The Florida Constitution and Legislative Classification for

Tax Assessment Purposes, 17 U. FLA. L. Rv. 609 (1965).
39. Lanier v. Overstreet, 175 So. 2d 521, 523 (Fla. 1965).

40. Id. at 523-24. (Emphasis by the court.)
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ary 1st of the tax year ....And all of the legislative directives
in this field appear to have been designed to make sure that,
in doubtful areas, the assessment will be made on the basis of
the actual use to which the property is designed to be put
during the particular tax year.
Returning again to highest and best use, the court said, "to be considered, the use must be expected, not merely potential or a 'reasonably susceptible' type of use; it must be expected immediately, not at
some vague uncertain time in the future. ' ' 41 Following this logic the
court concluded that no preferential treatment was being afforded
the farmer who desires to continue to till his soil while the expanding
urban community threatens to engulf him. And so the court held
that section 93.11 (3) of the Florida Statutes is a valid legislative
42
classification designed to secure a just valuation of agricultural lands.
Mr. Justice Drew, again joined by Justices Thomas and O'Connell,
authored a vigorous dissent. He affirmed the position that he had
taken in Tyson and further reinforced his argument by attempting
to scrutinize the intent of the Florida Legislature in enacting section
193.021. He argued that when the 1963 legislature was in session,
section 193.11, relating to the subject of assessment of real property
for tax purposes, had already been interpreted in Lanier v. Tyson 43 by
the Second District Court of Appeal in 1962. The district court had
held that although section 193.11 was limited to the requirement that agricultural lands should be assessed on an acreage basis
regardless whether they were in a plat of a subdivision or otherwise, such lands should still be valued for tax assessment purposes the
same as any other land. The 1963 legislature was fully cognizant
of the district court opinion, which was the law of Florida at the
time of that session. And so, in setting up the just value factors in
section 193.021, the legislature could not-have meant otherwise than
to embrace all real estate including agricultural lands. Justice Drew
also believed that only in this way could the county tax assessor
operate to maintain the necessary uniformity and equality of assessment that is required by the Florida Constitution. He concluded:44
To recognize the power of the Legislature to grant exemptions
from taxation to certain classes- and that's what it amounts
to- will be to destroy the ad valorem taxing system in this
State and to place the burden of government on those who are
not fortunate enough to be brought within a favored class. The
41. Id. at 524. (Emphasis by the court.)
42. Id. at 525.
43. 147 So. 2d 365 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
44. Lanier v. Overstreet, 175 So. 2d 521, 526 (Fla. 1965).
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Legislature has no power, under our Constitution, to exempt
any property from taxation. If this is to be changed, it should
be done by amendment to the Constitution and not by edict
of this Court.
In Markham v. Blount-5 the Florida Supreme Court tried to
establish a modus operandi for moving along the slippery path of
conflicting legislative enactments in the tax assessment field.
How do the conflicting directives of Florida Statutes, sections
193.11 (3), 193.021, and 193.11 (1) coincide and where do they fit
into the complex puzzle?
To first summarize the pertinent points of each: section 193.11 (3):
"[T]his subsection shall not be construed, interpreted, or applied so
as to permit lands being used for agricultural purposes to be assessed
other than as agricultural lands and upon an acreage basis." Section
193.11 (1): "The county assessor of taxes shall assess all property on
the basis provided in §193.021." Section 193.021, the "just value"
statute, substitutes seven criteria for determining just value and deletes the former standard of true or full cash value.46 These seven
factors include present cash value, highest and best use and present
use, location, quantity or size, cost, condition, and income.
In Blount the Broward County tax assessor-claimed that if he followed section 193.11 (1) using the seven factors of 193.021 he would
end up conflicting with section 193.11 (3), which was specifically concerned with agricultural assessments. The supreme court affirmed the
circuit court's ruling that the statutes are not in conflict with each
other.
Laying its foundation upon Tyson and using landmark decisions
concerning statutory construction, the court reiterated the philosophy
laid down in Harwarth v. City of DeLand:47 "The courts, in construing a statute, must, if possible, avoid such construction as will
place a particular statute in conflict with other apparently effective
statutes covering the same general field."48
How is the synthesis finally effected? Simply this, all three sections
are found to be constitutional. Section 193.021 creates a measure of
valuation for purposes of ad valorem taxes based on just value replacing the former standard of true or full cash value. This section
is consistent with the legislative duty to set up formulas for !he determination of just value as required by article IX, section 1 of the
Florida Constitution. Section 193.11 (3) of the Florida Statutes con-,
trols specifically the assessment of agricultural lands. Therefore, put45.

175 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1965).

47.

117 Fla. 692, 701, 158 So. 294, 298 (1934).

46.

FLA. STAT.

§§193.06, .11 (1) (1961).

48. Markham v. Blount, 175 So. 2d 526, 528 (Fla. 1965).
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ting the two sections together, as required by section 193.11 (1), the
49
following thesis was created:
In reading the factors of "just valuation" prescribed by Section
193.021 for agricultural property, the agricultural factor must
be taken into account as the only factor in each instance, concerning agricultural land. For example, the factor described in
Subsection 1 of 193.021 of "the present cash value of the property" as to agricultural property would be read and interpreted
as if it stated "the present 'agricultural' cash value of the property," and so on through the remaining six criteria or factors of
value described in said Section 193.021, Subsections (1) through
(7), both inclusive.
Justice Drew and Justice Thomas dissented, adhering to their
former stand as set forth in the minority opinion of Tyson and
Overstreet.
In the recent case of Stiles v. Brown,5o decided by the First District
Court of Appeal, the volcano erupted again but in a different form.
The issue was whether an assessment of agricultural lands was void
ab initio for the failure of the tax assessor to ascertain such classification when making the assessment.
Mr. Justice Rawls spoke for the court: 51
We hold that it is the duty of a landowner desiring the
beneficial treatment of Section 193.11 (3) to make known to the
taxing authorities his claim of utilizing the subject property for
agricultural purposes, either by making a timely return of his
property or by exhausting his administrative remedies and that
in the absence of a landowner so doing, an assessment which
does not give effect to said statute, is valid.
The facts found by the chancellor in the instant case are most revealing. The land in question had been used for bona fide farming
for over five years and thus came within the purview of Florida
Statutes, section 193.11 (3); but, in spite of this, the tax assessor
assessed the land on other than an agricultural value basis. The agricultural value of such lands was 32,909 dollars and the fair market
value of the tract was 576,390 dollars. In other words, its agricultural
value was less than 6 per cent of its actual fair market value.
In this case the appellants had made no timely affirmative action
to bring the agricultural character of their lands to the attention of
49. Id. at 528.
50. No. G-197, 1st D.C.A. Fla., Aug. 5, 1965.

51. Id. at 9.
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the tax assessor so as to receive the advantage of section 193.11 (3).
Instead, they relied upon the Graham v. City of West Tam pa,52 which
held:
Where the essential requirements of law are not observed in
making valuations of property for assessment, and the valuations as made are shown by admissions or proofs to be dearly
excessive, unjust, and unequal, appropriate relief may be had
in equity, even though the proceedings authorized by law for
seeking relief from administrative officers were not utilized,
where the case made shows a flagrant violation of or omission
to follow the mandatory requirements of the law in valuing
property for taxation.
Delving further into the recesses of section 193.11 (3), Judge
Rawls agreed with the lower court in holding that the landowner
must make his intent known to the tax assessor regarding utilization
of the land he owns if he wishes to secure a tax advantage. Judge
53
Rawls said:
Thus, it is the bona fides of the utilization by the landowner
that makes the land eligible for the benefits of the statute,
and the physical condition and appearance of the subject property is not of itself controlling. To require the tax assessor to
interrogate each owner of land and determine whether or not
he is utilizing the taxable land for bona fide agricultural purposes as defined by said statute would impose an intolerable
burden upon this official and local government.
The opinion of Judge Rawls conflicts, to some degree, with a
comment made in the Overstreet opinion. By requiring the landowner to take affirmative action to apprise the tax assessor of the
agricultural nature of his land, Judge Rawls implicitly recognizes
the preferential treatment that can be afforded agricultural lands
under section 193.11 (3). And yet, the Oversteet opinion explicitly
states that no preferential treatment is given.94
Another perplexing problem, latent in the Stiles case as well as
those previously discussed, concerns the valuation for agricultural
lands in eminent domain proceedings. In Stiles the fair market value
of the property in question was determined to be over 500,000 dollars,
whereas the valuation for agricultural assessment was placed at a little
52. 71 Fla. 605, 612, 71 So. 926, 928 (1916). The word "not" in the first
sentence of the quoted material does not appear in the official reporter; however,
it does appear in the West citation. Judge Rawls, who quotes this material in the
Stiles opinion, adopted the West citation.
53. Stiles v. Brown, No. G-197, at 7, Ist D.CA. Fla., Aug. 5, 1965.
54. Lanier v. Overstreet, 175 So. 2d 521, 524 (Fla. 1965).
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under 33,000 dollars. Although the fair market value is not the exclusive measurement in condemnation proceedings, it is a practical
and oft-employed standard. 55 And so it seems that another dual
system of valuation has been created. Thus the volcano continues to
erupt spreading its ashes in many unforeseen quarters.
THE RUSSIAN ROULETTE STATUTE

No present discussion of ad valorem taxes in Florida would be
complete without at least a mention of the 1965 Florida legislative
enactment, section 193.271, that has appropriately been christened
the "Russian Roulette Statute." The text of this statute appears in
Appendix II. The gist of this statute is that dissatisfied property
owners may challenge the tax assessment valuation set by the tax
assessor. The effective date was July 1, 1965.
As set forth in subsection 1 (K) (2), the legislative intent was "to
establish an alternate method of ascertaining the just valuation of
property when the owner elects to challenge the value established or
agreed to by the board of county commissioners meeting for the purpose of equalizing the assessment rolls."
The pertinent procedure under the statute permits a landowner
to file a certificate with the tax assessor that states the just value he
believes the land to be worth. The property is then placed on public
auction by the tax assessor at a price no less than the value stated
in the certificate filed by the landowner. In the event no bid is received at the auction, the amount set forth by the landowner is
established as the just value of the property and that amount is
entered on the tax rolls as the assessment basis.
If a higher bid is received at the auction than the value declared
by the taxpayer, he may either go forward with the sale or he may
elect to forfeit the bond he was required to post. This bond is set at
10 per cent of the value stated in the certificate. In the event the sale
is not consummated one-half of the bond is paid over to the bidder
with the other half being retained by the tax assessor.
Whether this novel method of self assessment meets all the requirements of the Florida Constitution remains to be seen. The
statute may very well be unconstitutional as an unauthorized delegation of the duties of the tax assessor. 56 Also, a very practical problem
will be raised if the statute is used indiscriminately by taxpayers. If
the tax assessor is overwhelmed by a storm of dissatisfied taxpayers,

55. Orange State Oil Co. v. Jacksonville Expressway Authority, 110 So. 2d 687
(1st D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
56. FLA. CONsT. art. VIII, §6; cf., Walter v. Schuler, 176 So. 2d 81, 84 (Fla. 1965).
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his ability to adequately assess property in his county will be greatly
hindered. The disturbing feature of this whole scheme is that there
is no attempt to guarantee bona fide implementation by the taxpayer.
To say the least, this statute creates another avenue that will add to
the complexity of an already complex situation.
CONCLUSION

I return again to the title of this article Ad Valorem Assessments
in Florida- Whither Now? A more than cursory examination of
this area reveals a problem that is of such broad scope legally as well
as socially that we can no longer ignore its existence. Nor can we
resort to solutions based on time-honored, but now threadbare, symbols and principles to solve completely the dilemma that we have
gotten ourselves into. The intricate legal maneuvering surrounding
the Tyson decision well illustrates this fact. Here the opposing
forces attempt to gain a toe hold through legal expediency and legal
verbiage.
Since the continuance of orderly government demands an adequate taxation basis and since this in turn revolves around knowledgeable assessment procedure, we must strike at the heart of the problem
and not fear to learn what is wrong with the system.
Changes of a vast substantive nature are needed rather than insignificant procedural wrestling with inconsequential symbols. Unless
this thinking permeates this vital area of the law, the ad valorem assessment process will crumble and chaos will result. A dual system of
land assessment, no matter how worthy the objective, cannot permanently solve the problem.
Especially true is that old adage, "A house divided against itself
cannot stand."
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APPENDIX I
(1963): "Lands zoned for agricultural purposes; assessment.
(1) The board of county commissioners of any county in the state is hereby
authorized and empowered in its discretion to zone areas in the county exclusively
used for agricultural purposes as agricultural lands; provided said lands have been
used exclusively for agricultural purposes for five years prior to such zoning.
(2) In the event that the board of county commissioners zone said lands as provided in subsection (1) then the board shall notify the tax assessor on or before
November 1 and the tax assessor shall immediately after January I of the succeeding
year and on January 1 of each succeeding year prepare and certify to the board of
county commissioners a list of lands in the county so zoned as agricultural lands.
(3) The board of county commissioners shall examine said list and classification
of such lands submitted by the tax assessor and shall make such reclassification
as shall be appropriate or justified, and as reclassified shall zone such lands in the
county for tax purposes only as agricultural.
(4) For the purpose of this section, "agricultural lands" shall include horticulture, floriculture, viticulture, forestry, dairy, livestock, poultry, bee and all forms
of farm products and farm production.
(5) The county tax assessor in assessing such lands so zoned and exclusively
used for agricultural purposes as described and listed shall consider no factors
other than those relative to such use. The tax assessor in assessing land within
this class shall take into consideration the following use factors only: The cost
of the property as agricultural land, the present replacement value of improvements
thereon, quantity and size of the property, the condition of said property, the
present cash value of said property as agricultural land, the location of said property, the character of the area or place in which said property is located and such
other agricultural factors as may from time to time become applicable.
(6) The board shall keep a record of such lands so zoned for tax purposes only
and restricted for agricultural lands and shall remove such zoning restrictions
whenever lands so zoned are used for any other purpose. (Emphasis added.)
FLA. STAT. §193.201

APPENDIX II
HousE BILL No. 1205
To Be Entitled
An act relating to tax assessments, challenges of; amending chapter 193,
Florida Statutes, by adding section 193.271; authorizing dissatisfied property owners
to challenge tax assessment valuation; establishing procedure; providing an effective date.
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida:
Section 1. Chapter 193, Florida Statutes, is amended by adding section 193.271
to read:
193.271 Property owner may challenge assessment value; procedure.(1) Whenever the owner of any real property or his agent complains of the
value fixed for his property by the county tax assessor, and after having raised
objections before the board of county commissioners meeting for the purpose of
equalizing the assessment rolls as submitted by the tax assessor, is dissatisfied
with the latest value placed upon his property, he may challenge this assessment
value in the following manner:

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol18/iss1/2

18

1965]

Wershow: Ad Valorem Assessments in Florida--Whither Now?
AD VALOREM ASSESSMENTS IN FLORIDA

(a) Within five (5) days after raising objections and getting a decision of the
board of county commissioners the owner shall file notice on the tax assessor that
he intends to challenge the assessment value fixed on his property.
(b) Within ten (10) days after filing the notice prescribed in paragraph (a)
the owner shall deliver to the tax assessor the following:
1. A certificate executed by the property owner, stating the amount he ascertains to be a just valuation of his property, together with an accurate description of
the property. A certificate may include more than one (1) parcel of land so long
as all parcels are contiguous and the amounts asserted as the just valuation are
itemized for each parcel.
2. Written authorization to the tax assessor requesting and empowering him to
advertise and conduct a public auction for the purpose of receiving cash offers for
the property in amounts of not less that the amount set forth in the certificate.
This authorization shall be accompanied by a filing fee of fifteen dollars ($15.00)
and a cash deposit or surety bond in the amount of ten per cent (10%) of the
value of the property stated in the certificate.
(c) After receiving all materials prescribed by paragraph (b) the tax assessor
shall cause prior notice to be published once each week for three (8) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the county that a public auction
will be held at the county courthouse at a time and day set forth for the purpose
of receiving cash offers to purchase the property. The property owner shall be
held responsible for the cost of publishing these prior notices and shall reimburse
the tax assessor for such costs.
(d) At the time and day specified, the tax assessor shall conduct a public auction
and accept the highest cash offer bid for the property but the lowest acceptable
bid shall be no less than the amount set forth in the certificate. The highest bidder,
hereinafter called the buyer, shail immediately deposit the amount bid with the
tax assessor and the tax assessor shall immediately notify the property owner by
certified mail, return receipt requested, of the details of the auction.
(e) Within thirty (30) days after the date notification is mailed as required
in paragraph (d) the property owner shall pay for and deliver to the office of the
tax assessor evidence of title in the form of an abstract of title prepared by an
abstractor acceptable to the tax assessor, purporting to be an accurate synopsis of
the instruments affecting the title to the real property recorded in the public
records of the county to the date of the public auction, showing the title to be
conveyed to be good and marketable or a title insurance binder issued by a title
insurer acceptable to the tax assessor, agreeing to issue to the buyer, upon the
recording of the deed hereafter mentioned, a title insurance policy in the amount
of the purchase price insuring the title of the buyer to the real property, excepting
only unpaid mechanics' and materialmen's liens, taxes and assessments for the
current year, any state of facts an accurate survey would show, and such standard
conditions and exceptions as usually are printed in policies issued by the title
insurer; and a map of a stake survey of the real property made on or after the
date of the public auction by a surveyor acceptable to the tax assessor, showing
no encroachments on the real property.
(f) The buyer shall have ten (10) days after delivery of the evidence of title
within which to inspect it and notify the property owner and tax assessor in
writing of any defects in the title.
(g) If the evidence of title shall not meet the requirements above specified,
and the buyer shall so notify the property owner and the tax assessor in writing
within the time prescribed, specifying the defects, the property owner shall have
fourteen (14) days after receipt of that notice to cure the defects, and will in good
faith exercise due diligence to do so. If the defects are cured within that time,
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the buyer shall have ten (10) days after the curing thereof to inspect the new
evidence of title and make written objections to the property owner and tax
assessor.
(h) If the defects are not cured within the time allotted the buyer shall have
ten (10) days after expiration of that time to notify the tax assessor and the
property owner in writing that he accepts the title notwithstanding the defects.
(i) In the absence of written objection or, if such written objection has been
given and subsequently written notice has been given by the buyer accepting title
notwithstanding any defects, the tax assessor shall, upon receipt of a good and
sufficient warranty deed, containing all the usual common law covenants of title,
conveying the property to the buyer in fee simple, delivered to him by the
property owner, shall deliver such deed to the buyer and shall immediately pay over
to the property owner the amount bid and paid by the buyer. The tax assessor
shall also return to the property owner the cash deposit or surety bond given upon
initially filing the written authorization as provided in subsection (1) (b)2. less any
amounts that may be due as required in paragraph (c).
(j) The property owner shall pay for the documentary tax stamps affixed to
the deed. The buyer shall pay the cost of recording the deed. The real property
tax for the year in which the balance of the purchase price is paid shall be prorated between the parties. The premium on any hazard insurance policy in force
covering any improvements on the property shall be prorated between the parties,
or the policy may be cancelled, as the buyer may elect. If the property is occupied
by a tenant when the balance of the purchase price is paid, the rent shall be
prorated between the parties. All prorating shall be as of the date the balance of
the purchase price is paid.
(k) In the event the property owner fails to deliver to the tax assessor a good
and sufficient warranty deed as provided in paragraph (i), within the time prescribed, the property owner shall forfeit the cash deposit or surety bond given
to the tax assessor with the written authorization as provided herein and the tax
assessor shall pay over one half (Y2) this amount to the buyer, together with a
return of the amount paid in pursuant to the buyer's bid. This shall be full and
complete compensation to the bidder and he shall have no other recourse against
the property owner and the tax assessor arising out of any of the measures taken as
provided in this section. The tax assessor shall retain the remainder of the forfeited cash deposit or surety bond.
(1) In the event that no bid is received at the auction, the amount set forth in
the certificate shall be established as the just valuation of the property and shall
be entered on the tax rolls of the county. If more than one (1) parcel of land was
included in the certificate the amount shall be applied to each parcel on a proportionate share basis.
(2) It is the intent and purpose of the legislature, in passing this act, to establish an alternate method of ascertaining the just valuation of property when
the owner elects to challenge the value established or agreed to by the board of
county commissioners meeting for the purpose of equalizing the assessment rolls.
Section 2. This act shall take effect upon becoming a law.
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